انا الحكومة

Jun 18

انا الحكومة

انا الحكومه انا الحكومة.

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We also highlight the following interesting cases of Twitter accounts that were targeted, even though we are unaware of any real-world consequences thus far:

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اقرأ / Read تصفح مجموعة منتجاتنا الخطية المترجمة، والتي توفر المعلومات حول بعض دفعاتنا وخدماتنا. Browse our range of translated written products, which offer information about some of our payments and services. About to retire or in retirement? /هل أنت على وشك التقاعد أو تقاعدت بالفعل؟ Are you a parent or guardian? / هل أنت والد أو وصي قانوني؟ Are you ill, injured or do you have a disability? / هل أنت مريض أو مصاب أو تعاني من إعاقة؟ Are you a seasonal, contract or casual (intermittent) worker? / هل أنت عامل موسمي أو عامل بعقد أو غير نظامي (متقطع)؟ Are you travelling outside Australia? / هل ستسافر إلى خارج أستراليا؟ Assistance for child care / مساعدة لخدمة رعاية الطفل Assurance of Support Australian Pension News - April 2017 Avoid a debt / تجنب ال د ين Beware of scams / احترس من الاحتيال Caring for someone? /هل تقوم برعاية شخص ما؟ Centrepay / ما هي خدمة Centrepay ؟ Child Dental Benefits Schedule Child Support / دفعة Concession and health care cards / Concession بطاقات التخفيض ( وبطاقات الرعاية الصحية Consent to disclose medical information form / موافقة على الإفصاح عن معلومات طبيّة Crisis Payment / فعة اﺍلأزﺯماتﺕ Crisis Payment for Humanitarian Entrants / دﺩفعة اﺍلأزﺯماتﺕ) للوﻭاﺍفدﺩﯾﻳنﻥ لأسبابﺏ اﺍلحالاتﺕ اﺍلإنسانﯾﻳة Disability Support Pension / معاش دعم الإعاقة (Disability Support Pension) Do you have a child turning four in this financial year? / هل لديكم طفل سيتم الأربعة سنوات في هذه السنة المالية؟ Express Plus Lite Family and domestic violence. It’s time to say enough / العنف الأسري والمنزلي. لقد حان الوقت لنقول كفى Family Tax Benefit Financial Information Service / خدمة المعلومات المالية How to make a complaint or provide feedback / طريقة تقديم شكوى أو تعليق Immunisation / التحصين Income Management - voluntary Information for carers / معلومات لمقدمي الرعاية Looking for work Making it easier to report employment income / لقد سھلّنا علیك عملیة الإقرار عن الدخل الوظیفي Needing help after someone has died? / هل تحتاج إلى المساعدة بعد وفاة أحد الأشخاص؟ Needing help in a crisis? /هل تحتاج إلى المساعدة في الأزمات؟ Newly arrived resident’s waiting period /فترة الإنتظار المنطبقة على الوافدين الجُدد المقيمين News for Seniors January 2016 New Zealand citizens claiming payments in Australia Online Security Top Tips factsheet / أهم النصائح للبقاء آمناً على الإنترنت Our Service Commitments / تعهداتنا بالخدمة Paid Parental Leave scheme for employers / Paid Parental Leave scheme لأرباب العمل Paid Parental Leave scheme for parents / Paid Parental Leave scheme للوالدين Parenting Payment / دفعة تربية الأطفال Pensioner Education Supplement Privacy and your personal information / الخصوصية والمعلومات الشخصية عنك Receiving your Medicare benefit payment /الحصول على دفعة إعانة برنامج Medicare

مزيد من المعلومات حول انا الحكومة

Executive Summary

Many people who are politically active in Bahrain conceal their true identity online to avoid reprisals or prosecution for criticizing the Government. Unsurprisingly, the Government wants to unmask these anonymous netizens. Since September 2011 or earlier, Bahrain’s Government has been targeting anonymous social media accounts, apparently in an effort to identify their operators. The Government targets accounts using malicious links and social engineering. It appears that the Ministry of Interior’s Cyber Crime Unit is orchestrating the attack. Victims receive malicious links from dozens of online accounts designed to appear legitimate: for example, an account named @Ali_Salman_, which impersonates the Secretary General of Bahrain’s largest licensed opposition party Al-Wefaq, and an account named @QamrAlKhalifa, a fake member of the Al-Khalifa ruling family. In some cases, the accounts are designed to impersonate the friends of a target: for example they created an account @aIboflasa to impersonate @alboflasa, a former army officer who became Bahrain’s first political prisoner after speaking at the Pearl Roundabout. The Government also sends malicious links through Facebook, e-mail, and likely via other services including YouTube, InstaMessage, and mobile messaging services including BlackBerry Messenger and WhatsApp. This attack puts the Cyber Crime Unit in the position of advising against “trusting strangers on social media networks,” while at the same time apparently exploiting this trust to compromise users.

Some of the malicious links sent by the Government are phishing links, as well as links to what appears to be spyware. However, the vast majority of the links are designed to reveal the IP address of the internet connection used to open the link. When an individual connects to the internet on his computer or phone, they are temporarily assigned an IP address by the phone company or internet provider whose service they are using (e.g., Batelco, Zain, Menatelecom, etc). Bahraini law requires that every time an IP address is assigned, the internet service provider must record the name of the subscriber of the internet connection, as well as the date and time. This information must be preserved for at least one year, and the security forces must be able to directly access this information at any time.

The Government apparently discovers an IP address by using various freely available IP Spy services. The services provide an easy three-step process for “locat[ing] your target:” first, you generate a link, then, you send it to your “victim,” who clicks on it, and finally, you receive an IP address via e-mail.

Typically, each anonymous account is targeted with a unique IP spy link. When someone clicks on one of these links, the Government receives the IP address of the internet connection used to open the link, and can request the name and address of the internet subscriber. However, this process does not reliably identify the author of an anonymous message. The author is correctly identified only if (1) the individual who clicked is the author of the anonymous message, and (2) the author clicked on the link while using an internet connection registered in their name (e.g., their personal 3G or home DSL service). However, these assumptions are not necessarily valid. Often, the attackers send links using mentions on Twitter; a user is alerted when they are mentioned in a Tweet, but that Tweet is also publicly visible. The attackers likely use this strategy because they do not have access to accounts that are friends of their desired targets; Twitter only allows an account to send private messages to its followers. Because Twitter mentions are public, people other than the intended target can see the IP spy links, and may click on them. Thus, the Government may receive the IP addresses of these people, who are not associated with the anonymous Tweet or the targeted account. We identify more than 120 cases where a Government account targeted a Twitter account with an IP spy link using a public mention. In these cases, an individual not associated with the targeted account may have clicked on the link. Even if an operator of the account clicks on the link, he may not be the author of the anonymous message; many targeted accounts have multiple operators.

Our report shows that in some cases, the Government infiltrates activist social networks by secretly accessing Twitter accounts while their operators are in prison. This allows the Government to privately target any of these accounts’ friends or followers without arousing suspicion. However, even if the Government’s targeting is perfect and the author of the message clicks on the link, they may do so while using a friend’s internet connection, or a public wi-fi access point. In this case, the Government would receive an IP address of someone not associated with the targeted account. In fact, the Cyber Crime Unit issued a recent warning that public wi-fi access points could be used to blackmail their operators. They remarked that this type of wi-fi is prevalent all across the island: “There are scores of open wireless connections from Manama to Riffa.”

Despite the unreliability of this IP Spy method in identifying the authors of anonymous messages, the Government appears to be relying on it to persecute and prosecute. Some anonymous users who have clicked on these links have been subjected to house raids, beatings, arrests, account hacking, and dismissal from their jobs. Some have been convicted in court and sentenced to jail for Tweeting. In many cases, the consequences that these individuals have suffered are apparently a direct result of them having clicked on IP spy links. Some who have been arrested in these cases report that during interrogation, they saw or were shown papers from their internet service provider. Several technically savvy individuals described the papers as showing an IP address and a date and time. Others claim interrogators explained that the papers proved they were guilty of operating their anonymous accounts, and demanded their confession on that basis.

In at least one case, an operator of an anonymous Twitter account clicked on an IP spy link using someone else’s internet connection; the subscriber of the connection was jailed for operating the account despite having no connection to it.

The Government’s IP spy attack has targeted journalists, labor unions, human rights groups, activists, licensed opposition groups, parody accounts, whistleblowers, Sunni groups, vigilantes, and even residents opposed to the seizure of their homes to build a government housing project. We highlight several cases of victims of this attack:

We also highlight the following interesting cases of Twitter accounts that were targeted, even though we are unaware of any real-world consequences thus far:

Source: https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php

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